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A short-lived signature is a digital signature with one distinguishing feature: with
the passage of time, the validity of the signature dissipates to the point where valid
signatures are no longer distinguishable from simulated forgeries (but the signing key
remains secure and reusable). This dissipation happens “naturally” after signing a
message and does not require further involvement from the signer, verifier, or a third
party. This thesis introduces several constructions built from sigma protocols and
proof of work algorithms and a framework by which to evaluate future constructions.
We also describe some applications of short-lived signatures and proofs in the domains
of secure messaging and voting.
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A digital signature is forever. Or at least, until the binding between key and identity
is no longer reliable, or the underlying signature scheme is broken. This is often in
contrast to what is strictly required in real world applications: a signature needs to
only provide authenticity for a few seconds to conduct an authenticated key exchange
or a few days for a signed email.
We might think this overreaching security does not matter. However, philosoph-
ically, it appears to violate the principle of least privilege if cryptographic proof
that two entities once formed a secure connection or exchanged emails lives on for
decades. Thus at best, such longevity is unnecessary. However in certain cases, we
may explicitly not want this information to survive.
The idea that message authentication should not be universally verifiable is called
deniability. Limiting who can verify messages could be done by limiting to a set of
participants identified with public keys (designated verifier signatures), or by limiting
in time (this work), or both. Achieving deniability could be an interactive process
(OTR messaging) or non-interactive (this work).
Our intuition for what deniability means might be stronger than the actual guar-
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antee. Informally, deniability means there is no cryptographic proof that Alice sent a
particular message. There may still be circumstantial proof—logs or testimony—but
there will be no proof beyond what would exist had Alice simply sent the message in
plaintext with no message integrity.
A short-lived signature can be thought of as a proof of the following predicate:
either Alice signed this message or someone did a lot of work recently. The work in
the second clause can be done without Alice’s knowledge or involvement. The amount
of work can be considered to be d units of time, while recently can be considered to
mean that the work started no earlier than a certain time t. While the signature is
fresh, the difference between t and the present moment is smaller than d and thus
only the first clause can be true. After the passage of time, t becomes greater than
d time units ago and thus the second clause is potentially true. Losing the ability
to distinguish the truth of the first clause from the second leads to our notion of
deniability.
The fact that short-lived signatures provide deniability for the sender of a message
without the sender needing to know the receivers private key, nor without having
to interact with the sender, makes it uniquely qualified for achieving deniability in
several practical scenarios, including sending signed email to a set of individuals who
do not have known public keys. To our knowledge, ours is the first primitive to enable
this.
Contributions. Our primary contributions are as follows.
1. We propose four constructions for short-lived signatures, some of which are
compiled from a short-lived Σ-protocol.
2. We provide a framework for desirable properties for short-lived signatures, show-
ing that our four constructions offer different subsets, and that the discovery of
3
an ideal signature that achieves all is still an open problem.




Preliminaries and Related Work
We consider in this section three types of related work: a set of building blocks we
will use to construct short-lived signatures, primitives that could be used to achieve
the same (or very similar) goals as a short-lived signature, and finally primitives
that use the same building blocks for orthogonal goals. All of our protocols will be
described using the discrete log setting but can be adapted to elliptic curves for faster
computation and more compact representations.
2.1 Proof Systems
2.1.1 Proof Systems (without Zero-Knowledge)
The traditional notion of a proof system is a method by which a prover convinces
a verifier of a claim. The prover provides evidence of their claim (this is called the
witness) and the verifier in a either accepts or rejects the proof as appropriate.
There is a lot of variation amongst different styles of proof systems. One major
distinction is whether the proof system is interactive or non-interactive. This basically
describes whether the verifier needs to participate in the generation of the proof or can
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simply accept a completed transcript of the proof itself to validate. In an interactive
proof, the back and forth between prover and verifier is made up of a series of messages
consisting of commitments, challenges and responses.
Unlike the classic definition of a proof, where an accepted proof is absolute evi-
dence of the validity of a prover’s claim, the proof systems we consider are probabilis-
tic: with some negligible probability a prover may be able to construct a convincing
proof for a false claim. The degree to which a proof system lowers this probability
is called its soundness. For example, the soundness of the proofs we consider are
overwhelming, meaning 1 −  where  is a negligible probability in some security
parameter1. By contrast, some proofs might have less soundness: for example, cut-
and-choose protocols[EP84] might have soundness of 1
n
for some value n which are
highly, but not overwhelmingly, sound.
Another distinction is whether having unbounded computational abilities is of any
assistance at all to the dishonest prover in having unsound proofs be accepted by an
honest verifier. If computational abilities do not help, the proof is consider perfectly
(or unconditionally) sound. If soundness requires the prover to be computationally
bounded, it is called computationally sound (or an argument instead of a proof). We
do not try here to categorize all proof systems but focus instead on a particular subset
that is useful for cryptographic purposes called Sigma-Protocols (defined below). We
will make extensive use of a technique called the Fiat-Shamir heuristic which results
in a computationally sound proof. In this case, we assume a real-world entity cannot
not generate enough fake proofs that one will happen to accept at random.
In order to prove the soundness of a proof system, a typical approach is to show
that a dishonest verifier can extract the witness (or information equivalent to the
knowledge being proven) from an honest prover producing valid proofs in polynomial
1If ` is the security parameter, negl(`) ≤ 1poly(`) .
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time. Informally, the argument for why this works is as follows: if the witness can be
extracted, then the proof must be ‘aware’ of the witness whereas an unsound proof
would, by definition, not be aware of the witness. Of course, the prover may not
want the verifier to extract the witness which motivates the idea of a zero-knowledge
proof in the following section.
A proof system must also satisfy the property of completeness which essentially
says that is capable of producing a validating proof when the witness is actually
correct for the statement being proven. To have the completeness property, it should
be the case that given an honest prover and verifier, the prover should convince the
verifier of the validity of their claim with high or overwhelming probability.
2.1.2 Zero-Knowledge
A proof of knowledge on its own places no limits on what information the verifier
learns by executing the protocol. For example, to prove that a particular number
is composite, a prover could reveal the factorization of the number as part of their
proof. However there are situations where it is highly desirable to limit the amount of
information the verifier gains. On the extreme end, we can have zero knowledge proofs
of knowledge which reveal nothing about the prover’s claim aside from whether it is
true or false. Zero knowledge is shown by the existence of a simulator which, given a
claim, can produce an accepting transcript of the proof using only public information.
Like soundness, the zero knowledge property can be either computational or perfect




Proofs are define for a wide class of problems; indeed, a celebrated result shows
that any statement in PSPACE can be proven with an interactive proof (and these
can be made zero-knowledge under the assumption of a one-way function) [Sha92].
However these proofs are not necessarily, and often are not actually, efficient by
any means. Therefore cryptographers have proposed zero-knowledge proof templates
that are versatile for proving useful things but also efficient. The most well-studied
cryptographic zero knowledge proof is likely the proof of knowledge of a discrete
logarithm given by Schnorr[Sch91]. In fact, it is a special case of a general template
of proof called a Sigma protocol (or sometimes informally, this class of proofs are
called ‘Schnorr proofs’).
2.2.1 Interactive Sigma Protocols
Schnorr Proof of Knowledge of a Discrete Logarithm. Alice chooses secret
key x ∈ Zq for a prime-ordered multiplicative group of size q, computes public key y =
gx mod p for large safe prime p (where p = 2q+1) and generator g of Gq. Alice wants
to prove to Bob that she knows x without telling Bob anything about x beyond the
values of 〈p, q, y〉. Alice chooses random a ∈ Zq and sends b = ga mod p to Bob. Bob
chooses a random challenge c and sends it to Alice. Alice computes d = a+ cx mod q
and sends it to Bob. Bob accepts the proof as correct if gd
?
= b · yc mod p.
This template of a proof can be generalized into a Sigma protocol. A Sigma
protocol is a three move proof that takes its name from the shape of the flow of
communication, which resembles the Greek capital letter sigma. In the first stage,
the prover commits to a value and sends the commitment to the verifier. The verifier
then replies with a challenge. The prover uses this challenge to compute a response
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for the verifier. Finally, the verifier checks if the response is correct and accepts or
rejects the proof accordingly.
We now illustrate some properties shown to be held by all sigma protocols; how-
ever we will illustrate them with the Schnorr ZKP specifically.
Public Coin. Since the verifier’s challenge need only be a random value (and not
of any particular structure or based on a secret that the verifier knows), we call it
a public coin protocol. If we had a source for public random numbers, the verifier’s
role could be eliminated (we return to this later with the concept of beacons).
Completeness. One can verify that Schnorr is complete from the provided descrip-
tion: indeed gd = b · yc mod p holds when the values are constructed according the
protocol using the actual x.
Special Soundness. Special soundness implies the existence of a polynomial time
knowledge extractor that, given two accepting transcripts (a, c, r) and (a, c′, r′) where
c 6= c′ and r 6= r′, allows recovery of the witness (or knowledge equivalent to it). In




Transferability. Given an accepting proof transcript between a prover and a ver-
ifier, is the verifier able to also convince a third party to accept the proof? We call
such a proof transferable if the verifier is able to do so (or non-transferable if not).
Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge. For the time being, we will make use of a
weaker form of zero knowledge called honest verifier zero knowledge (HVZK) which
assumes the verifier will always behave correctly and only achieves the zero knowledge
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property in such a case. A dishonest verifier can make a transferable proof (e.g.,, using
Fiat Shamir below).
2.2.2 Non-interactive Sigma Protocols
Sigma protocols are interactive three move protocols. For many applications it is
useful to be able to convert these into non-interactive protocols. By using the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic, we are able to make Sigma protocols non-interactive. To preserve
the soundness property, the prover’s commitment value must be fixed before the
challenge is chosen so that a dishonest prover cannot construct a valid proof for
a secret they do not actually have knowledge of. To ensure the challenge value is
generated after the commitment is fixed, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic has the prover
hash the commitment using a cryptographic hash function and use the result as the
challenge value. For example, to make the Schnorr Sigma protocol non-interactive,
the value of c is computed as c = Hash(b) and when verifying, the verifier must also
check that the prover used the correct challenge (i.e., check that Hash(b) is actually
equal to c).
Weak vs. Strong Fiat-Shamir. There exist two variants of the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic, dubbed weak and strong [BPW12]. In weak Fiat-Shamir, the challenge
value is computed simply as the hash of the commitment value (i.e., c = Hash(b) for
a Schnorr proof). The strong variant of Fiat-Shamir also includes the statement to
be proven in the challenge computation (i.e., c = Hash(b, p, q, y) for a Schnorr proof,
which is the commitment and the public key). Strong Fiat-Shamir is necessary in
cases where the statement being proven can be adapted on the fly, so these values
must also be committed to somehow. For our purposes, which rely on identification
protocols, the weak version of Fiat-Shamir is sufficient to ensure the security of the
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protocol.
Random Oracle Model. The Random Oracle Model is a way of modeling func-
tions (usually hash functions) as if they were truly random to facilitate security
arguments [BR93]. Given an input it has never seen before, the random oracle will
generate a value at random (e.g., from consecutive flips of a coin), record it and
output the value. If it receives the same input value at a later time, it will notice
it has seen this value before and return the same output value. It is possible to set
the output value for a particular input in advance of calling the random oracle on
that input value. This is called programming the random oracle. One paragraph.
It basically models a hash function is a formal way. You give a query to the oracle
(akin to the input to a hash) and it flips coins (for fixed lenght akin to output of
hash), tells you the value, and writes it down so if you ask the same query again, it
responds the same way. Random oracle in a proof can be programmed: choose the
output first (randomly!) and then you can give it out and say when a certain query
comes in, you will assign this random value to its output.
Completeness of Fiat-Shamir for Schnorr. To prove completeness, we need to
show that the following equation holds: gd
?
= b · yc mod p. Recall that b = ga and
y = gx, so we have gd
?
= ga · (gx)c mod p. We can further simplify the right-hand side
to gd
?
= ga+cx mod p and since we computed d as d = a + xc in the final step of the
protocol, we see that the original equation holds.
Soundness of Fiat-Shamir for Schnorr. To prove soundness, we assume an
honest prover that will produce accepted transcripts using the witness x as specified
by the protocol, and a malicious verifier called the extractor who will attempt to
extra-filtrate the value of x from the transcript. If the extractor is successful, the
11
proof is indeed based on x and thus is sound (an unsound proof would be a transcript
that accepts, is not based on x, yet in this case, it wouldn’t be possible to extract x
from it). At the same time, the extractor will use special powers real world adversary
do not: being able to program the random oracle, thus an extractor will not work
in real life when the random oracle is a real hash function. We will use the special
soundness property and the fact that two accepting transcripts 〈b, c, d〉 and 〈b, c′, d′〉
where c 6= c′ and d 6= d′ are sufficient to extract the witness x. The verifier lets the
prover issue a first transcript 〈b, c, d〉, it then rewinds the prover to the point in time
that it has chosen b but has not yet asked the random oracle for the hash of b to
generate c and it instructs the oracle to erase its value of b. Then the oracle will
pick a new random value c′, overwhelmingly likely to be different than the first c and
the prover will compute the corresponding d′. The extractor will use these values to
compute x.
Zero-Knowledge of Fiat-Shamir for Schnorr. To prove zero-knowledge, we
assume an honest verifier and a dishonest prover called the simulator. Because we
are in the random oracle model, the simulator is allowed to program the random
oracle. Its goal is to produce a transcript that is accepting to the honest verifier
without actually knowing the witness. If it can do this, the transcript must be zero
knowledge because it is possible to produce without knowing the witness. At the same
time, because it will be instantiated in the real world with a real hash function that
cannot be programmed, real provers have less power than the simulator and cannot
use this to break soundness. The simulation strategy is as follows: the simulator
chooses d ∈ Zq at random, it asks the oracle for a random output value for not-yet-
specified input and uses this as c, it computes b = gd · y−c mod p, and finally it asks




Input: public keys 〈g, p, q, y1 = gx〉, 〈h, p, q, y2 = hx〉 and signing key x.
1. Alice chooses t ∈r Z∗p and uses it to compute a = gt and b = ht.
2. She computes the challenge value c = Hash(a, b).
3. Finally, she calculates r = t+ cx and outputs σ = 〈a, b, c, r〉.
Verification
Input: public keys 〈g, p, q, y1 = gx〉, 〈h, p, q, y2 = hx〉 and transcript σ.
1. The verifier checks that gr = ayc1 and h
r = byc2. If both of these equalities are true, then the
proof is accepted.
Protocol 1: Non-interactive AND-Composed Proof of Equivalence of the Discrete
Logarithm [CP92]
thus when the verifier asks the oracle, Hash(b) = c.
2.2.3 AND-Composition of Sigma Protocols
Sigma protocols are fairly simple protocols but can be used as building blocks to
construct ones which are more complex. Conjunction (logical and) is fairly straight-
forward. The prover executes two Σ-protocol in parallel with a common challenge.
The verifier accepts only if they would accept both protocol runs individually.
It can be carried out in both interactive and non-interactive modes. We describe
the non-interactive version in Protocol 1. To make it interactive, the c challenge value
becomes a random value supplied by the verifier. This protocol is an example of an
and composition of two Schnorr proofs with different public keys. It is also know as
a Chaum-Pedersen proof of equivalence of the discrete log [CP92].
2.2.4 OR-Composition of Sigma Protocols
Disjunction (logical or), however, is more complicated.Trivially, this could be carried




Input: public key 〈g, p, q, ya = gwa〉, signing key wa and second public key 〈g, p, q, yb = gwb〉.
1. Alice chooses ta ∈r Z∗p and uses it to compute aa = gta .
2. Then she simulates a proof of knowledge of wb by choosing values eb, tb ∈r Z∗p and computes
ab as ab = y
−ebgtb and rb = ab + ebx.
3. She computes the challenge value c = Hash(aa, ab) and uses it to also compute ea = c⊕ eb
4. Finally, she calculates ra = aa + eax and outputs σ = 〈aa, ab, ra, rb, ea, eb, c〉.
Verification
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y = gx〉, and signature σ.





b and that c = ea ⊕ eb. If both of these
equalities are true, then the proof is accepted.
Protocol 2: Non-interactive OR-Composed Schnorr Proof of Knowledge [CDS94]
true.The obvious drawback to this approach is that the verifier can now distinguish
which of the two statements is true. By taking a slightly more involved approach, it
is possible to structure a proof in such a way as to make it impossible for the verifier
to distinguish which statement the prover was able to successfully prove.
The prover wishes to prove knowledge of one of two witnesses: wa or wb. We
will assume the prover knows wa. He will first simulate a proof for wb to get ab,
eb, rb. He then computes aa as usual and sends both commitment values aa and ab
to the verifier. The prover receives random challenge c. However, this challenge is
not used in this form directly. Using it directly in the proof of knowledge for wa
would leak which witness the prover has knowledge of since it has no interaction
with the simulated proof yet. To connect it with the simulated proof, the prover
combines c and eb to get ea (for example, by computing the ⊕ of the two values).
The prover can now compute ra according to the protocol and sends ra, rb, ea, eb.
The verifier accepts if ra and rb equalities hold and ea ⊕ eb equals c. To make this
proof non-interactive, the challenge is changed to be the hash of the two commitment
values (i.e., c = Hash(aa, ab)). For an example using two non-interactive Schnorr
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proofs of knowledge, see Protocol 2. Note that though Protocol 2 combines two
of the same Sigma protocol, this type of composition also supports combining two
different Sigma protocols. Another example of an OR composition is the protocol
from Cramer, Damg˚ard and Schoenmakers in [CDS94].
Though we lose the zero knowledge property through these types of composition,
honest verifier zero knowledge is preserved. Note that we described disjunction and
conjunction with only two witnesses, but since these properties can be composed
with each other it is possible to perform these operations with an arbitrary number
of witnesses.
2.2.5 PoWorK
A PoWorK is a proof construction introduced in [BKZZ16]. These proofs are indis-
tinguishable proofs of work or knowledge (hence the name PoWorK). This means
that upon seeing a PoWorK transcript, the verifier is unable to determine whether
the prover actually had knowledge the witness, or instead carried out the necessary
amount of work. The authors provide a framework for combining a Sigma protocol
with a proof of work algorithm to achieve this goal. We will make use of one specific
instantiation of a PoWorK as the basis of one of our short-lived constructions later
on(see Figure 3.
2.3 Signatures
Digital signatures are a public key primitive used to bind an identity to a message.
A signature scheme is composed of a pair of algorithms: Sign(x, y) that takes a
message x, public key y and produces signature s, and Verify(m, s, z) which takes a
message m, signature s and public key z and outputs accept if s is a valid signature
15
Proof of Work or Knowledge (PoWorK)
Proof of Knowledge Mode
Input: public key 〈g, p, q, y = gx〉 and signing key x.
1. She selects a difficulty δ such that TimeEst(δ) corresponds to the length of time that the
proof should be valid. Let the output size of a collision-resistant hash function Hash() be λ
bits.
2. She chooses r ∈r Z∗p and computes a = gr.
3. The challenge is constructed as follows: c0 = Hash(a) and c = c0 ⊕ c1, where c1 = (u, v, w)
as defined next. s← {0, 1}λ, u = LSBδ(Hash(s, w)), v ← {0, 1}λ2−δ, w ← {0, 1}λ2 .
4. She finally computes d = a+ cx. She outputs signature σ = 〈a, c, d, s, u, v, w, δ〉.
Proof of Work Mode
Input: public key 〈g, p, q, y = gx〉.
1. At tˆ0, Alice chooses dˆ ∈r Zp, and cˆ ← {0, 1}λ and computes aˆ = gdˆycˆ, cˆ0 = Hash(aˆ, mˆ, btˆ0)
and cˆ1 = cˆ⊕ cˆ0.
2. She begins computing sˆ such that uˆ = LSBδ(Hash(sˆ, wˆ)).
3. At tˆ1 ≈ tˆ0 + TimeEst(δ), Alice finds an acceptable sˆ. She outputs 〈mˆ, σˆ, τ〉 with signature
σˆ =
〈
aˆ, cˆ, dˆ, sˆ, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ
〉
and time information τ =
〈




Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉, and signature with timing information 〈σ, τ〉.
1. At t1, Bob checks that t1 < t0 + TimeEst(δ).
2. He sets c0 = Hash(a) and c1 = (u, v, w).
3. He checks that c = c0 ⊕ c1 and u = LSBδ(Hash(s, w)).
4. He checks that gd = ayc. He outputs accept only if all checks hold.
Protocol 3: Non-interactive Proof of Work or Knowledge built from a Schnorr
proof [BKZZ16]
of m under public key z, or otherwise it rejects the signature. For the purposes of
this thesis we will focus on signatures based on identification protocols – interactive
proofs of knowledge that prove possession of a private key to a verifier – however
there are a variety of other methods of constructing digital signatures. The primary
property that defines a digital signature scheme is unforgeability. That is, without
prior knowledge of the private key, an attacker should not be able to create a signature
that verifies. There are various degrees of unforgeability a protocol may possess:
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under universal forgery an attacker would be able to create an accepting signature for
any message, under selective forgery an attacker would be able to create an accepting
signature only for select messages, and finally existential forgery where an attacker is
able to create accepting signatures with no control the message which is signed. We
can consider unforgeability in a variety of different attack scenarios that determine
what other information the attacker has available: a known message attack where
they have some number of messages – not of their choosing – and their accompanying
accepting signatures, a chosen message attack allows the attacker to submit some
list of messages to be signed and receive their accepting signatures, and finally an
adaptive chosen message attack which is similar to a chosen message attack except the
attacker is allowed to alter their submissions based on the outcome of prior results.
Ideally a good digital signature scheme would be one that is existentially unforgeable
even under an adaptive chosen message attack. In [PS96], the authors first show
that the Schnorr signature scheme is secure against existential forgery in an adaptive
chosen message attack. They go on to extend this more generally to any signature
scheme made from an honest verifier zero knowledge identification protocol. The
computational complexity of such an attack against these signature schemes would
be equivalent to the underlying mathematically hard problem.
2.3.1 Schnorr Signatures
One of the simplest examples of a digital signature is a Schnorr signature. We can
construct it by taking the Schnorr proof of knowledge, applying the Fiat-Shamir




Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, y = gx〉 and signing key x.
1. Alice chooses random r, with 0 < r < p− 1 and gcd(k, p− 1) = 1.
2. She computes a = gr mod p.
3. She uses the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to calculate the challenge c = Hash(m).
4. Finally, she computes d = r−1(c− xa) mod (p− 1).
5. She outputs the signature σ = 〈m, d, a〉.
Schnorr
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y = gx〉 and signing key x.
1. Alice chooses random r, with 0 < r < q.
2. She computes a = gr mod p.
3. She uses the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to calculate the challenge c = Hash(m, a).
4. Finally, she computes d = a+ xc mod (p− 1).
5. She outputs the signature σ = 〈m, d, c〉.
DSA
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y = gx〉 and signing key x.
1. Alice chooses random r, with 0 < r < q.
2. She computes a = (gr mod p) mod q.
3. She uses the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to calculate the challenge c = Hash(m).
4. Finally, she computes d = r−1(c+ xa) mod q.
5. She outputs the signature σ = 〈m, d, a〉.
Protocol 4: Signature generation for ElGamal, Schnorr and DSA constructions.
Schnorr Signature. Alice chooses secret signing key x ∈ Zq and computes public
verification key y = gx mod p for large safe prime p and generator g of Gq. Alice
signs message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ by choosing random r and computing s = 〈s1, s2, s3〉 =
Signx(m, r) =〈s1 = gr mod p, s2 = H(m‖s1), s3 = r + s2 · x mod q〉. Bob verifies 〈m, s〉,
the signature on the message, by ensuring gs3
?
= s1 · ys2 and s2 ?= H(m‖s1).
2.3.2 DSA
DSA, the Digital Signature Algorithm, was specified as part of the Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) by NIST in 1994. Along with ECDSA, its elliptic curve variant,
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DSA is one of the most commonly used digital signature schemes. A DSA signature
bears a strong resemblance to a Schnorr signature with one major change to the final
response step borrowed from the ElGamal signature scheme (see Protocol 4).
2.3.3 Designative Verifier Signatures and Proofs
Designated verifier signatures. With a designated verifier signature, the follow-
ing predicate is proven: either Alice signed this message or I know Bob’s private
key [JSI96]. Bob will believe the first clause since he knows Alice does not know his
key, however he cannot convince anyone else that the first clause is true since he can
make the second clause true. A designated verifier signature scheme can be built
from a Σ-protocol with the same property. Short-lived signatures are compatible
with designated verifier proofs/signatures and provide a different but complementary
notion of deniability: one that is time-based instead of person-based. In an event
when Alice knows Bob’s private key, she can limit verification of the signature to Bob
and for a period of time. When she does not know Bob’s private key, she can only
limit verification for a period of time.
A more minor practical concern is if Alice sends to multiple recipients, the size
of a short-lived signature is constant in the number of receivers, while a designated
verifier signature grows linearly in the number of receivers. For email, this likely
matters little, but for constrained one-way messaging like SMS, it might play a role.
Relation to designated confirmer signatures. With a designated confirmer
signature, signature verification is interactive rather than non-interactive. If the
entity verifying the signature (the confirmer) (i) responds only to certain people or
(ii) stops responding after a certain amount of time, the signature can no longer
be verified. DV signatures can be thought of a non-interactive version of (i), while
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short-lived signatures are a non-interactive version of (ii). Non-interaction simplifies
the logistics of deniability considerably: Alice can send an email and go oﬄine, and
the signature will expire without any future involvement from her.
2.4 Other Building Blocks
Moderately-hard functions. Computing a moderately hard function consumes
a certain amount of computational resources, which can be used to impose a price
or time delay on an entity. These are variably called pricing [DN92], timing [FM97],
delaying [GS98], or cost [GJMM98, Bac02] functions; and time-lock [RSW96, BN00,
MMV11] or client [JB99, ANL00, DS01, WR03, WJHF04, DMR06, TBFG07, CMSW09,
SKR+11] puzzles. Proof of work is sometimes used as an umbrella term [JJ99].
Among other applications, proof of work can be used to deter junk email [DN92,
GJMM98] and denial of service attacks [JB99, DS01, Bac02, WR03, WJHF04], con-
struct time-release encryption and commitments [RSW96, BN00], and mint coins in
digital currencies [RS96, Bac02, Nak08].
We consider a puzzle as three functions: 〈Gen, Solve,Verify〉. The generate func-
tion p = Gen(d, r,m) takes difficulty parameter d, randomness r, optionally a message
string m and generates puzzle p. The solve function s = Solve(p) generates solution
s from p. Solve is a moderately hard function to compute, where d provides an ex-
pectation on the number of CPU instructions or memory accesses needed to evaluate
Solve. Finally, verification Verify(p, s) accepts iff s is a correct solution to p.
Time-stamping and carbon-dating. Time-stamping is a mechanism to establish
a particular message is at least as old as a certain time. Time-stamping schemes use
trusted entities [HS90, BdM91, BHS91, BdM93, BLLV98, PRQ+98, MB02] and have
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been standardized.2 Carbon dating [CE12, MMV11] is a trustless form of time-
stamping that uses a moderately hard puzzle. Specifically, if difficulty d is a quantity
of time, then publishing 〈p = Gen(d, r,m), s = Solve(p)〉 is proof that m is no newer
than d units of time in the past.
Random beacons. While time-stamping proves a message is no newer than some
past time, a random beacon [Rab83] provides a random number that is verifiably
no older than some past time. Beacons can be based on an unpredictable source of
randomness that is verifiable after the fact, such as financial data [WJHF04, CH10]
or Bitcoin’s blockchain [BCG15].
2.5 Other Related Work
The following are a few primitives and protocols that we do not make use of, however
are related somewhat to our results. We thus provide them to distinguish how our
results are different from them.
Deniable encryption. In deniable encryption schemes [CDNO97], message confi-
dentiality is inherent. Further the sender must know the receivers’ public key. With
short-lived signatures, message confidentiality is an orthogonal concern: signatures
can be applied to plaintext or ciphertext.
Time-lock encryption. In time-lock encryption [RSW96], an encrypted message
becomes decryptable after an investment of a configurable amount of work. Short-
lived signatures can be considered an analogue of time-lock encryption for signature
schemes.
2ISO IEC 18014-3; IETF RFC 3161; ANSI ASC X9.95
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Timed commitments and signatures. Timed commitments are an analogue
of time-lock encryption for commitment schemes: a committed message becomes
unhidden after an investment of a configurable amount of work [BN00]. The authors
also extend their timed commitment construction to a ‘timed signature’ which likely
sounds like the same primitive we are defining. However their timed signature solves a
different problem relating to fair contract signing: a timed signature can be gradually
released, and an investment of an amount of work can recover the signature if such a
release is aborted early.
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Chapter 3
Short-Lived Signatures and Proofs
A short-lived signature or proof is one whose truth erodes after a certain amount of
time. By integrating a proof of work, our short-lived protocols allow indistinguishable
forgeries to be created after an investment of time and resources. The motivation for
this was provided in Chapter 1.
We begin with a ‘folklore’ short-lived signature which is to sign a message with
a weak key. We improve this, combining existing primitives, to demonstrate that
short-lived signatures are possible following this paradigm but require some addi-
tional things beyond just using a weak key. Later, we ‘remix’ the elements of this
construction to build short-lived signatures in a more systematic way. Specifically,
we build them by first building a short-lived zero knowledge proof and then using the
Schnorr ZKP-to-Signature transformation to convert them into signatures. This is
more modular than the enhanced folklore construction, which starts with a regular
signature and ends up with a short-lived signature but cannot be used as a short-lived
proof. Further both short-lived proofs and short-lived signatures are useful indepen-
dently and we give example use cases in the next chapter that use one but not the
other.
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Folk+ construction steps Improvement achieved
〈Signs¯k(m)〉 Original construction with weak key s¯k
〈Signsk(m),TREnc(sk)〉 Strong sk; time-release encryption
〈(sk, pk)← KeyGen(b, n), Signsk(m),TREnc(n)〉 Define earliest signing time〈
Signskl(sk, b), Signsk(m),TREnc(sk)
〉
Plug into PKI where skl is a long-term
signing key
Table 3.1: Progression from the original Folk construction to our enhanced short-
lived Folk+ construction. Across the constructions, different signing keys are used:
s¯k is a weak key, sk is full-strength key, and skl is a full-strength long-term key.
3.1 A folklore construction and an improvement
One folklore construction for short-lived signatures is often mentioned (although we
cannot find an authoritative reference for it): sign the message with a weak key.
By itself, this has numerous undesirable properties that we will sequentially explore,
while also fixing them (a summary is given in Table 3.1). The result is an improved
but impractical variant we call Folk+. Despite Folk+ being unwieldy, it serves as a
pedagogical example: it shows the building blocks that can be used to construct a
short-lived signature. In the next section, we start from scratch with these building
blocks to make more concise short-lived signature schemes.
The notion of using a weak key is also presented in the analogous work on time-
release encryption [RSW96] where the authors consider the idea of using a weak
symmetric key. The authors (Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner) dismiss this idea for two
reasons: exhaustive search is trivially parallelizable (a problem that we will revisit,
as it is difficult to avoid in some of our constructions, and we denote constructions
that achieve it as having puzzle sequentiality in Table 3.2) and the amount of work
is configured on expected running time which could vary from actual running time in
amounts that might make a practical difference. In the case of a signature scheme, this
second issue is exacerbated by the fact that exhaustive search is not the best known
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algorithm for finding signing keys in most signature schemes, and the best known
algorithm could actually change based on the size of the key itself (e.g., factoring or
computing discrete logarithms). Thus determining an appropriate size for a weak key
is non-trivial, not well-studied, and sensitive to the signature’s setting and possibly
its public parameters. A better approach is to use time-release encryption itself—a
primitive designed for exactly what we want. The signer can sign the message with a
full strength key sk (instead of a weak signing key s¯k) and then time-release encrypt
the full-strength key, TREnc(sk), with the desired difficulty.
If a recipient of a message signed in such a fashion sees this pair of values, a signa-
ture and a time-release encryption, 〈Signsk(m),TREnc(sk)〉, two necessary conditions
exist for which this signature is a forgery: (i) the time-release encryption actually
contains the signing key sk and (ii) the signature has been seen for a sufficient amount
of time for sk to be released. As it stands, the first property (i) cannot be verified
a priori — the value might the time-release encryption of any value. Thus in an
improved version, we might want to achieve property that states that it should be
apparent from inspection of the signature that forgeries can be created after an in-
vestment of resources. We call this property releasability in Table 3.2. Releasability
may be possible to add to Folk+ with an involved zero-knowledge proof but we do
not pursue it here.
In terms of (ii), observe that there is no way to tell how long these values have
been observed. If you receive an email signed in this fashion with a time release
proportional to 1 day, it might be a valid message (i.e., not a forgery) from Alice or
it might be a just-completed forgery that Bob started creating yesterday. If we can
prove the signature is freshly generated, this resolves this issue. We can do this using
a beacon. Specifically we can incorporate a random value b from the beacon in the
signing key (by using a random nonce n we define next). Note that it is not sufficient
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to incorporate b into the signature itself, the message being signed, or the plaintext
of the time-release encryption: since the signing key is time-released, once the key
is known, the adversary can sign any message (using any beacon value) following
any modified signature algorithm and re-encrypt it. The construction will appear as:
〈(sk, pk)← KeyGen(b, n), Signsk(m),TREnc(n)〉.
To complete this construction, we need a method for deriving a sk based on the
beacon value. Since sk will be released upon completing the proof of work on the time-
release encryption, it is not necessary that one can determine sk was derived from b
from inspecting pk (otherwise, we’d require a zero knowledge proof or something like
a verifiable random function). It will eventually become apparent, once sk is released,
whether b was used. The simplest method to achieve this is to generate a random
nonce n (of the same size as a signing key) and commit it with the beacon (e.g.,
by hashing the two together and mapping into the keyspace) and use this combined
value as the signing key sk = Hash(b, n). A verifier will repeat this process, once they
have recovered n from the time-release encryption, by recomputing sk and pk using
the asserted beacon value b and validating that these values actually produce the
keys that were used. Note that if b is not integrated into the key in some way that is
binding, then the beacon could be swapped out for a different value and this signature
ceases to be short-lived since the accepting period of time cannot established.
The final consideration is that such a signature burns the signing key sk. While
sk could be used a few times if messages were being sent from the same time interval,
it will expire rapidly. This creates a PKI problem because signing keys need to
be associated with identities through some mechanism, such as certificates. There
is at least one simple solution: Alice can maintain a longterm signing key skl and
certificate, and sign her ephemeral short-lived keys (Signskl(sk)) to chain them back
to her certificate. We consider this a necessary property of short-lived signatures,
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which we call PKI compatibility in Table 3.2. This extra signature also gives us a
place to include the beacon that will not become compromised after the time-release
of the encryption as it is protected by the long-term key which is never released:
(Signskl(sk, b)). Thus b is no longer needed in (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(b) and the design
becomes cleaner.
This completes our Folk+ construction. The first observation is that it is quite a
long signature, involving two signatures and one encryption. Next, we will consider
more concise constructions. Folk+ also lacks a few properties we will see in our
next constructions, including the ability to generalize to a short-lived Σ-protocol and
the ability to use arbitrary proof of work schemes instead of being bound to ones
that admit time-release encryption. Finally, forgeries cannot be created until a valid
signature is first created. Thus seeing an expired Folk+ short-lived signature proves
that Alice signed at least one message after b was published; later constructions will
enable forgeries apropos of nothing.
3.2 An initial attempt
Given the length of Folk+ (two signatures and one encryption), we now consider how
we can ‘remix’ the elements of Folk+ (e.g., a beacon and proof of work) into a more
concise construction for a short-lived signature. To build a short-lived signature from
scratch, we consider first building a short-lived Σ-protocol and then transforming it
into a signature.
Recall for a proof of knowledge of some x ∈ L, a Σ-protocol is a three move
protocol where the prover sends a, receives c from the verifier, and responds with
z. Applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (c = H(L, a)), it can be compiled into a non-
interactive proof of knowledge. By binding the message to c (c = H(L, a,m)), it can
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be transformed into a signature by the individual who knows x.
This attempt at a short-lived scheme is an adaptation of the idea for a ‘pricing’
or proof of work function proposed by Dwork and Naor[DN92]. They propose, as
a proof of work, using a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme where the moderately hard
problem is creating a forgery. To create a forgery, one can either find x or one can
simulate fake signatures until the Fiat-Shamir value happens to equate. The degree
to which the latter is possible is controlled by a security parameter t: the output of
c = H(L, a,m) is truncated to t bits.
In the scheme of Dwork and Naor, the fact that they use a signature instead
a Σ-protocol as the basis for their proof of work is incidental. The message being
signed plays no role in the Dwork-Naor construction so, with the hindsight of ensuring
research on Σ-protocols, we can simplify their construction to create a short-lived Σ-
protocol based on ‘grinding’ Fiat-Shamir (FS) values (hence the name of the next
scheme, FS-Grind, which evolved out of this first attempt). We simply truncate c to t
bits for a moderately sized value of t (e.g., t=40 bits). Thus an accepting Σ-protocol
transcript is due to either: the fact that it is a valid proof issued by a prover who
knows x or it is a forged proof issued by someone that solved the proof of work. For
now, there is no way to tell which is the case.
However if a verifier saw such a Σ-protocol transcript and knew it was ‘freshly’
generated—the elapsed time is less than the time required to solve the proof of work—
he could conclude it is a valid proof issued by the prover who knows x. As the
elapsed time grows, he can no longer conclude this and the proof’s validity becomes
uncertain (or in the signature case, the signature becomes deniable). The freshness
can be accomplished by incorporating a beacon value b, however we will discuss one
point further before specifying where to insert b.
The final step will be to transform this Σ-protocol into a signature. For a Fiat-
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Shamir-based Σ-protocol, the transformation is to add the message to the hash used
to compute the challenge c. In our case, the truncation of c to allow grinding a
forged proof also impacts the collision resistance of the hash; specifically, the hash
is no longer collision resistant. This is a problem because collision resistance must
hold for both the message m and the beacon b (assuming b is added to this hash) —
therefore the transformation does not work in this, and it does not work for either
the signature scheme or the Σ-protocol. If the beacon can be integrated in a binding
way to a value other than c in the proof, this construction could possibly be repaired
to work for Σ-protocols, however we will fix it in a more thorough way that works
for both signatures and Σ-protocols in the next section.
3.3 FS-Grind
The main component of an FS-Grind signature is a modified Chaum-Pedersen pro-
tocol which is a proof of knowledge of the equality of two discrete logarithms (see
Section 2.2.3). The base of the first discrete logarithm is the public key, g, while
the second base is a hash h of the message and a random beacon value. The proof
will prove knowledge of x given 〈g, h, gx, hx〉. This allows us to incorporate b (and in
the case of a signature, both b and m) into the proof transcript with a full-fledged
collision-resistant hash function, repairing the issue with our previous attempt. Note
that for every proof (and signature), the value of h changes from signature to signa-
ture but the value of g and gx is always the same—since gx is the signer’s public key,
this means the signer can use the same key for multiple signatures which is important
for using an established PKI.
FS-Grind is given in Protocol 5. We specify the signature version (for a short-




Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉 and signing key x.
1. At t0, Alice obtains randomness bt0 = GenRand() from beacon.
2. She selects a difficulty δ such that TimeEst(δ) corresponds to the length of time that the
signature should be accepted.
3. She computes h = Hash(m, bt0), sets y1 = y and y2 = h
x.
4. She chooses r ∈r Z∗p, computes a1 = gr, a2 = hr, c = Truncδ(Hash(a1, a2)) and computes d =
r+ cx. She outputs 〈m,σ, τ〉 where signature σ = 〈h, y1, y2, a1, a2, c, d〉 and time information
τ = 〈t0, bt0 , δ〉.
Verification
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉, and signature 〈σ, τ〉.
1. At t1, Bob checks that g
d = yc1a1, h
d = yc2a2 and c = Truncδ(Hash(a1, a2)). He then checks
that VerifyPuz(GenPuz(b, δ), sb). Finally he checks that t1 < t0 + TimeEst(δ). He outputs
accept only if all checks hold.
Forgery
Input: a forged message mˆ.
1. Selective Forgery: At tˆ0, Eve computes hˆ = Hash(mˆ, btˆ0), chooses y2 ∈r Zp, dˆ ∈r Zp and
cˆ ∈r Zp. She computes aˆ1 = y−cˆ1 gdˆ and aˆ2 = y−cˆ2 hˆdˆ. She selects difficulty δˆ and checks if cˆ =
Truncδˆ(Hash(aˆ1, aˆ2)). If this does not hold, she selects new random values and recomputes.
She will expect to repeat this for TimeEst(δ).
2. Completion: At tˆ1 ≈ tˆ0 + TimeEst(δ), Alice finds an acceptable cˆ. She outputs 〈mˆ, σˆ, τ〉 with
signature σˆ =
〈
hˆ, y1, y2, aˆ1, aˆ2, cˆ, dˆ
〉
and time information τ =
〈
tˆ0, btˆ0 , δ
〉
.
Protocol 5: Signature and verification for FS-Grind instantiated with Schnorr sig-
nature.
hash of the two commitment values, one using each base exponentiated to the same
randomness, the base which contains the hash of the message as well as that base
exponentiated with the signing key. Before use, the challenge is truncated to the
desired difficulty level which determines the validity period of the signature. The
final response is the same as a standard Schnorr signature.
The verification step of an FS-Grind signature also works much the same as in
a Schnorr signature except that the check has to be done against both bases. In
addition, the verifier should check that the correct challenge value was used.
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To forge an FS-Grind signature, Eve selects a random challenge and response
value and uses these to calculate commitment values. She then checks if the random
challenge value matches the expected value from hashing the commitments. If not,
she can pick new random values and try again.
3.4 Workflow
The Workflow construction is quite similar to FS-Grind. They both admit forgeries
upon finding a certain hash output (where the size depends on a chosen difficulty
parameter). This hash value is used directly or indirectly as the challenge value in
a standard Σ-protocol, and thus both FS-Grind and Workflow can be used as short-
lived Σ-protocols or transformed into signatures using the standard transformation.
Both grapple with the issue that a full-size hash function is needed for security, while
finding a “correct” a truncation of the hash to δ bits enables a proof of work that
can be easily integrated into the protocol.
In FS-Grind, we move the message and beacon out of the challenge and into two
new values, linked by their discrete logarithm being the secret key, base the protocol
on the AND-composition within an Σ-protocol, and have the challenge be small. With
Workflow, we keep the message and beacon in the challenge but work on structuring
the challenge to be both (1) full length for collision resistance, and (2) accepting even
if only some subset of the challenge are ‘correct.’ We base Workflow on recent work
by Baldimtsi et al. [BKZZ16] on building indistinguishable proofs (or Σ-protocols)
of work or knowledge (which they call PoWorKs). PoWorKs and Workflow are very
similar with the following differences: Workflow is a signature, Workflow conforms to
being short-lived while PoWorKs are designed with a different application in mind
(see Section 2.2.5), and to realize the short-lived property, Workflow uses a beacon
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value.
The intuition of Workflow is as follows: for Σ-protocols in general, if the proof
transcript is a forgery provided by a prover that does not know the witness, there
is generally only a single value from a large message space that will make the proof
accept. The job of the malicious prover is to find this value. Typically it cannot
be found directly, it can only be found through trial-and-error — in this case, it is
because the value is a preimage to a preimage resistant hash function. With Workflow,
the proof is set up as an OR (see Section 2.2.4): there are two sub-challenges that are
combined into a single challenge, and once one sub-challenge is programmed by the
adversary, the other sub-challenge has a fixed value that the prover needs to deal with.
To transform the proof into a signature, we use the same standard transformation
(Fiat-Shamir to make it interactive, and adding the message to the hash to make it
a signature).
In the proof of knowledge setting (i.e., when the prover actually knows the signing
key), the prover will generate a puzzle solution first and work backwards to derive
the corresponding puzzle. The puzzle is defined by the value of the work-side sub-
challenge, combined with the knowledge-side sub-challenge, and combined to form the
actual challenge in the proof/signature. Alternatively, in the proof of work setting
(i.e., when the signer is forging a signature), the knowledge-side sub-challenge is
chosen first and the commitment value is calculated from it. The puzzle-side sub-
challenge can now be calculated with both challenge values fixed, and the prover
begins to solve the proof of work to find the one value that will accept. The one
value that will accept is one value from a set of values defined by how many bits the
hash is truncated to.
The signature has been modified to be forgeable but it is not yet a short-lived




Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉 and signing key x.
1. At t0, Alice obtains randomness bt0 = GenRand() from a beacon.
2. She selects a difficulty δ such that TimeEst(δ) corresponds to the length of time that the
signature should be valid. Let the output size of a collision-resistant hash function Hash() be
λ bits.
3. She chooses r ∈r Z∗p and computes a = gr.
4. The challenge is constructed as follows: c0 = Hash(a,m, bt0) and c = c0 ⊕ c1, where c1 =
(u, v, w) as defined next. s← {0, 1}λ, u = LSBδ(Hash(s, w)), v ← {0, 1}λ2−δ, w ← {0, 1}λ2 .
5. She finally computes d = a+ cx. She outputs 〈m,σ, τ〉 where signature σ = 〈a, c, d, s, u, v, w〉
and time information τ = 〈t0, bt0 , δ〉.
Verification
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉, and signature with timing information 〈σ, τ〉.
1. At t1, Bob checks that t1 < t0 + TimeEst(δ).
2. He sets c0 = Hash(a,m, bt0) and c1 = (u, v, w).
3. He checks that c = c0 ⊕ c1 and u = LSBδ(Hash(s, w)).
4. He checks that gd = ayc. He outputs accept only if all checks hold.
Forgery
Input: message mˆ for forged signature.
1. Selective Forgery:
At tˆ0, Eve chooses dˆ ∈r Zp, and cˆ ← {0, 1}λ and computes aˆ = gdˆycˆ, cˆ0 = Hash(aˆ, mˆ, btˆ0)
and cˆ1 = cˆ⊕ cˆ0. She begins computing sˆ such that uˆ = LSBδ(Hash(sˆ, wˆ)).
2. Completion: At tˆ1 ≈ tˆ0 + TimeEst(δ), Eve finds an acceptable sˆ. She outputs 〈mˆ, σˆ, τ〉 with
signature σˆ =
〈
aˆ, cˆ, dˆ, sˆ, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ
〉
and time information τ =
〈
tˆ0, btˆ0 , δ
〉
.
Protocol 6: Signature and verification for Workflow instantiated with Schnorr sig-
nature.
modification, we return to the challenge hash value and add a random beacon value
to the computation from the time the signature is being generated (or any time
earlier). This value will show that the signature could have been generated no earlier
than the time corresponding to the included beacon value. Combined with the time
requirement to solve the proof of work, this fixes a time after which this signature will
become indistinguishable from one which has been forged. For a detailed description
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of Workflow signatures, see Protocol 6.
Finally, we identify and fix a small flaw in the original PoWorK proposal. In
Protocol 6, what we call v is chosen at random regardless of whether the signature
is a forgery or not. In the original paper [BKZZ16], this value v is chosen to be
an extension of the hashed bits comprising u when the PoWorK is knowledge-based
and it ends up (with overwhelming probability) being random when the PoWorK is
work-based. Thus knowledge/work is not truly indistinguishable.1
3.5 Carbon
Like our previous constructions, Carbon begins with a Schnorr Σ-protocol as a base.
However unlike in our earlier constructions, we will integrate the proof of work into
the commitment phase instead of the challenge phase of the protocol. This allows for
a greater degree of flexibility in choosing a proof of work protocol.
To generate a Carbon signature in the proof of knowledge setting, Alice will first
commit to a random value and use it to generate the proof of work puzzle. Upon
solving this proof of work, Alice can continue with generating the signature. She will
compute a hash of the message and a beacon value to form the challenge and fix
the beginning of the validity period of the signature. Lastly, she will calculate the
response value and output the signature information.
To forge a Carbon signature, Alice computes the challenge value as before and
generates a random response value. She uses these values to calculate what the
commitment should be so that she is able to generate the proof of work puzzle. Upon
1The exact issue arrises in the security proof of statistical indistinguishability within Theorem
2 of [BKZZ16]. The authors make the following statement: “it is obvious that Solve(1λ, h, puz))
outputs a random soln from the solution set of puz, which is identically distributed to the solution
soln in (puz, soln)← SampleSol(1λ, h, puz)).” However the authors do not prove they are identically




Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉 and signing key x.
1. At t0, Alice chooses a ∈r Z∗p and computes b = ga. Alice generates puzzle pb = GenPuz(b, δ)
with difficulty δ. She begins computing sb = Solve(pb).
2. At t1  t0, Alice completes computation of sb.
3. At t2 ≥ t1, Alice obtains randomness rt2 = GenRand() from beacon. She generates c =
Hash(rt2 ,m) and computes d = a− cx. She outputs 〈m,σ, τ〉 where signature σ = 〈b, c, d, sb〉
and time information τ = 〈t2, δ〉.
Verification
Input: message m, public key 〈g, p, q, y〉, and signature with timing information 〈σ, τ〉.
1. At t3, Bob checks that b = y
cgd. He checks rt2 = GenRand(t2) and checks that
c = Hash(rt2 ,m). He then checks that VerifyPuz(GenPuz(b, δ), sb). Finally he checks that
t3 < t2 + TimeEst(δ). He outputs accept only if all checks hold.
Forgery
input: timing information τ and forged message mˆ
1. Selective Forgery: At tˆ0, Eve chooses dˆ ∈r Zp and generates cˆ = Hash(rt2 , mˆ). She computes
bˆ = ycˆgdˆ. Eve generates puzzle pˆb = GenPuz(bˆ, δ) with difficulty δ. She begins computing
sˆb = Solve(pˆb).
2. Completion: At tˆ1  t0, Eve completes computation of sˆb. She outputs 〈mˆ, σˆ, τ〉 with
signature σˆ =
〈
bˆ, cˆ, dˆ, sˆb
〉
and same time information τ = 〈t2, δ〉.
Protocol 7: Signature, verification and forgery of Carbon.
completion of the puzzle, Alice can output an accepting but forged Carbon signature.
For a full description of both of the signature modes and verification, see Protocol 7.
Carbon features two main drawbacks. The first is that upon witnessing a fresh,
valid signature, Bob may be able to prevent the signature from expiring naturally by
continuing the proof of work (the others do not have this drawback and schemes that
do not are considered Persistent in our comparison below).
The second drawback is that in order to generate a valid signature both the
legitimate prover and the forger have to carry out the full proof of work (while the
verifier does not). This proof of work can be pre-computed (it does not depend on
the signing key or message) and multiple messages might be batched together with
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one-precomputed puzzle, however this is a significant drawback. In our comparison
below, we say Carbon does not achieve No pre-computation as a result. The trade-off
is PoW-independence where Carbon can use any proof of work scheme that provides
the carbon-dating property.
3.6 Security
The protocols Carbon, FS-Grind and Workflow are very similar to each other. We
outline some differences below. However to prove they are proper signatures, we use
FS-Grind as a representative on the family of protocols. We first prove it a short-
lived Fiat-Shamir-based Σ-protocol and then we rely on the standard Σ-protocol-to-
signature transformation for constructing a signature (we do not prove this transfor-
mation and instead refer the reader to [Sch91]).
Completeness. To prove completeness, we need to show that the following two
equations hold: gd
?
= yc1a1 mod p and h
d ?= yc2a2 mod p. Beginning with g
d, recall
that a1 = g
r and y1 = g
x, so we have gd
?
= gr · (gx)c mod p. We can further simplify
the right-hand side to gd
?
= gr+cx mod p and since we computed d as d = r+cx in the
final step of the protocol, we see that the original equation holds. Now for hd, recall
that a2 = h
r and y2 = h
x, so we have gd
?
= gr · (hx)c mod p. We can further simplify
the right-hand side to hd
?
= hr+cx mod p and since we computed d as d = r + cx in
the final step of the protocol, we see that the original equation holds.
Short-lived Special Soundness. To prove soundness, we assume an honest prover
that will produce accepted transcripts using the witness x as specified by the protocol,
and a malicious verifier called the extractor who will attempt to exfiltrate the value of
x from the transcript. If the extractor is successful, the proof is indeed based on x and
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thus is sound (an unsound proof would be a transcript that accepts, is not based on
x, yet in this case, it wouldn’t be possible to extract x from it). At the same time, the
extractor will use special powers real world adversaries do not: being able to program
the random oracle, thus an extractor will not work in real life when the random oracle
is replaced by a real hash function. We will use the special soundness property and
the fact that two accepting transcripts 〈a1, a2, c, 〉 and 〈a1, a2, c′, r′〉 where c 6= c′ and
r 6= r′ are sufficient to extract the witness x. The verifier lets the prover issue a
first transcript 〈a1, a2, c, 〉, it then rewinds the prover to the point in time that it has
chosen a1 and a2 but has not yet asked the random oracle for the hash of a1 and a2
to generate c and it instructs the oracle to erase its value of a1 and a2. Then the
oracle will pick a new random value c′, overwhelmingly likely to be different than the
first c and the prover will compute the corresponding r′. The extractor will use these
values to compute x as x = s−s
′
c−c′ .
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge. To prove zero-knowledge, we assume an hon-
est verifier and a dishonest prover called the simulator. Because we are in the random
oracle model, the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle. Its goal is to
produce a transcript that is accepting to the honest verifier without actually knowing
the witness. If it can do this, the transcript must be zero knowledge because it is
possible to produce without knowledge of the witness. At the same time, because
it will be instantiated in the real world with a real hash function that cannot be
programmed, real provers have less power than the simulator and cannot use this to
break soundness. The simulation strategy is as follows: the simulator gets a value
bt0 from the beacon, computes h = Hash(bt0) and chooses y2, d ∈ Z∗p at random, it
asks the oracle for a random output value for not-yet-specified input and uses this
as c, it computes a1 = g























































































Folk • • • 1
Folk+ • ◦ • • • 3
FS-Grind • • • • • • • 2
Workflow • • • ◦ • • • • 1
Carbon • • • • • • 1
Table 3.2: A comparison of various short-lived signature constructions.
to program the output value it received as its response to the input (a1, a2) — thus
when the verifier queries the oracle, c = Hash(a1, a2).
3.7 Evaluation
No short-lived scheme we have described possesses all of the properties listed here
and they each offer a different subset allowing them to be useful in a variety of
situations. This list is not exhaustive and there may be other useful properties we
have overlooked in our evaluation.
Setting independent. Constructions achieving this property are those which do
not require a specific mathematical setting (e.g., discrete log, RSA) in order to func-
tion. This allows our constructions to adapt to future advances in cryptographic
attacks against digital signatures.
All of our protocols were described generically (in the case of Carbon, Folk) or
using the discrete log setting for the sake of consistence and readability (FS-Grind,
and Workflow). The discrete log constructions can be adapted to other settings, such
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as using elliptic curves, as necessary. Though Folk+ was also described generically,
in order to satisfy the puzzle sequentiality property as well it must be in the RSA
setting.
PKI compatibility. Most uses of digital signatures today rely on the TLS public
key infrastructure or the PGP web of trust. Ideally any short-lived signature con-
structions should be compatible with these (i.e., they make use of long term signing
keys).
All of the short-lived signature schemes we describe, with the exception of the
basic Folk construction, allow for these long term keys to be used for signing.
Allows Σ-protocol. We defined our short-lived constructions as signatures, how-
ever we have identified use cases which would rely on short-lived proofs instead. It
would be preferable if our constructions support both of these modes, signature and
proof.
Neither of the folklore constructions (Folk, Folk+) are capable of being used in a
proof mode. FS-Grind, Workflow and Carbon can be used in a proof mode, however,
as they are built from Sigma protocols. To do so, the only necessary change is to
omit the message m from the protocol (and for interactive proofs, the challenge value
may be provided by the verifying party).
PoW-independent. Constructions with this property do not prescribe a particular
proof of work algorithm and will work with a variety of them.
Folk requires exhaustive search on a key. Folk+, meanwhile, can use any time-
release encryption scheme. However, we only assign ◦to Folk+ due to its unique ability
to satisfy the puzzle sequentiality property. In order to achieve puzzle sequentiality,
the proof of work algorithm must be carefully chosen. A Carbon signature can be
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made using any non-interactive proof of work. FS-Grind specifies grinding a specific
hash or hash image prefix. Workflow is described using a similar proof of work to
FS-Grind, however a generic definition is also given by [BKZZ16] that will work for a
short-lived signature as well.
No pre-computation. To what degree, if any, is pre-computation required for a
particular short-lived scheme. Constructions with this property allow for faster and
more frequent signature generation.
With the exception of Carbon, none of the other short-lived signatures we de-
scribed require any computation to be carried out in advance.
No persistence. Since our short-lived constructions integrate a proof of work into
a signature (or proof), it may be possible to extend the lifetime of a signature slightly
beyond what was intended by continuing the proof of work. We call this persistence
and consider it undesirable.
None of Folk, Folk+, FS-Grind or Workflow allow for signature persistence. Car-
bon is the only one of our constructions missing this property. Upon witnessing an
accepting Carbon short-lived signature, the verifier can prevent it from expiring by
continuing the proof of work. However, once even a Carbon signature expires it cannot
be made to appear fresh again.
Releasability. Consider a short-lived signature σ on message m as 〈m,σ,∆t, b〉
where ∆t is the time (or work) required to create forgeries and b is the beacon value
or freshness of the signature. If a short-lived signature is releasable (•), it should be
clear from the inspection σ itself that the asserted values of ∆t and b are the values
actually used in the construction of σ. If the fact that one or both of the asserted
values ∆t and b are known to be used only after completing a proof of work, it is
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said not to be releasable (but it is still a short-lived signature). If the assertions can
never be established, it is not a short-lived signature.
In the case of Folk+, there is no guarantee that the time-released signing key will
actually produce valid signatures when used until after the work has been completed.
All of the other proposed short-lived schemes do not make use of signing keys in order
to execute forgeries, relying solely on the proof of work instead so seeing one of these
signatures assures releasability.
Key-only forgeries. How much does the adversary have to see before she can
generate a forgery? By allowing forgeries without a valid signature having ever been
created, the signer is afforded a slightly greater degree of deniability.
For Folk+, a public key and at least one valid signature is necessary. In addition
to a valid signature, Folk also requires the release of the private signing key. Our other
constructions, FS-Grind, Workflow and Carbon, allow forgeries with just knowledge of
the public key.
Puzzle sequentiality. Short-lived signatures blend together the human and com-
putational notions of time. Inherently sequential proof of work algorithms are those
for which future steps of the puzzle rely on past intermediate results. This allows
for better bounds on time estimates as it will limit parallelizing the computation of
proofs of work.
We only know of sequential puzzles for time-release encryption, and thus Folk+.
Modular exponentiations To compare the complexity of each of the short-lived
constructions, we can consider the number of modular exponentiations required to
generate a fresh signature (rather than a forgery, which is an inherently expensive
process) as this is likely to be the mostly computationally intensive step of each
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construction.
Folk only requires a signature with a weak key, requiring one modular exponen-
tiation. Folk+ requires one for each of the two signatures, as well as one more for
the time-release encryption for a total of three exponentiations. FS-Grind, which is
built from the parallel composition of two signatures, requires two exponentiations.
Workflow and Carbon both each only require a single modular exponentiation.
3.8 Extensions
Fine-grained difficulty. In FS-Grind and Workflow, the difficulty of the puzzle
consists of finding a pre-image that produces a specific hash output that is truncated
to δ bits. The probability of a hash output matching is thus 1/2δ. An increase or
decrease in δ by 1 will double or halve the difficulty. We would like finer-grain control
where the difficulty can be set to an exact amount. We illustrate a transformation
on Workflow (and the same principle can be applied to FS-Grind).
The crux of Workflow is computing the value LSBδ(Hash(s, w)) such that it equals
a given value u. To allow finer grained control, we were permit hash outputs that
are both exactly u and also close to u as defined by some distance. For example,
LSBδ(Hash(s, w)) should be in the interval [u, u + γ] (technically u + γ mod δ). In
this case, the probability is γ/2δ which can take on any probability given a choice
of both γ and δ. To preserve indistinguishability, when an honest signer is produc-
ing an accepting signature, they will compute u = LSBδ(Hash(s, w)) and instead of
outputting u itself, they will construct the interval [u, u+ γ] and choose a uniformly
random value in this interval as u.
Designated verifier. In addition to regular digital signatures, short-lived signa-









Figure 3.1: Comparing the properties of short-lived signatures with designated verifier
signatures. Specifically, which parties are able to verify a signature over time.
signatures limit verification to a subset of people while short-lived signatures allow
anyone to verify within a specific timeframe.
A short-lived signature has no problems scaling to an arbitrary number of verifiers,
while a DV signature size will increase as the set of verifiers grows, making these
signatures unwieldy for groups larger than a few participants. DV signatures also
require the verifier to have a public key and for the signer to be aware of it at the
time of signature generation. Whereas for our short-lived signatures the signer does
not need to know who will be verifying the signatures, let alone their public keys.
Though we contrast short-lived signatures with designated verifier signatures here,
they do serve different purposes and it would not be simple or make sense to replace
a DV signature with a short-lived signature in certain cases. In such a scenario they
could actually be combined to produce a short-lived designated verifier signature
which would limit both the scope of verifiers as well as the timeframe in which they
are able to undeniably verify the signature (see Figure 3.1).
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Estimating time. A short-lived signature could find use in practically any situa-
tion a conventional digital signature is used. The shorter the required validity period,
the better. This is due to how we define time in our protocols. There is no obvious
way to integrate real world time so we use expected computation time as an analogue.
In practice this will vary based on the resources available to the forger. Since most
of the proof of work algorithms used by our protocols are not inherently sequential,
the completion of the puzzles can be sped up by parallelizing the computation across
more CPU cores. How to mitigate this problem, either through inherently sequential





In this chapter, we provide a few use cases for short-lived signatures (deniable email
and instant messaging) and short-lived Σ-protocols (coercion-resistant, end-to-end
verifiable voting).
Recall in Section 1 we briefly mentioned the principle of least privilege. There is
little to be gained from allowing signatures to be attributed to a signer for longer than
is strictly necessary. Traditional digital signatures already have a de facto expiration
date that coincides with the expiration of the signing key. However these timelines
for expiry are usually measured in years and are universal across all signatures made
by a signing key. Most signatures only need to last a few seconds (in an interactive
setting like a TLS handshake or instant messaging) or a few days (for non-interactive
settings like email). By utilizing short-lived signatures with a suitable work factor
as a drop in replacement for traditional digital signatures, we are able to facilitate
deniability with minimal overhead.
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4.1 Email
One of the simplest applications of a short-lived signature is email. Most scenarios
in which a person would desire the security provided by a PGP signed or encrypted
email are sensitive in nature and affording some deniability after the fact is likely to
also be a desirable property.
By utilizing short-lived signed email, for example, a whistleblower would be able
to reach out to a journalist such that the journalist can trust they’re communicating
with the same source, but after the fact the signatures on received messages are no
longer trustworthy. A complementary approach, designated verifier signatures, would
also allow for this type of deniability but require advanced knowledge of the receivers
public key, which may not be known at the outset of an exchange. Once a public key
has been exchanged, however, a short-lived DV signature could be used to further
limit the verifiability of the signature to one or more parties as well as for a limited
time.
4.2 Deniable Multiparty Messaging
4.2.1 Background
Off the record messaging (OTR) is an instant messaging protocol for end to end
encrypted conversations between two parties. It aims to provide similar security
properties to a private, in-person conversation, hence the name. In addition to con-
fidentiality and authentication that other messaging protocols commonly provide,
OTR also affords deniability.
In a face-to-face private conversation between two or more parties, once the con-
versation has ended neither party can prove that any particular statement was or was
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not made or that the conversation even took place. In electronic protocols, signatures
are often used to provide message integrity and to authenticate the sender. However,
this leaves no room for deniability after the fact short of publishing the private keys,
an approach we have already dismissed as unable to scale.
To permit deniability, OTR makes use of message authentication codes (MACs),
a symmetric key primitive that verifies the integrity of a message. In a two party
protocol like OTR, since MACs make use of symmetric keys they also authenticate
the sending party of a message, much like a digital signature. If Alice sees a message
with a valid MAC that she did not send, she knows it must have come from Bob
since he is the only other person who knows the MAC key.
Unfortunately, since MACs can only provide authentication in this two party
setting, there has been no obvious way to scale OTR to a group or multi-party
setting. By using a short-lived signature instead of a MAC it could be possible to
construct a multi-party OTR protocol in which the messages expire after an agreed
upon amount of time.
There have been several attempts to define a multi-party version of OTR such
as [BST07][GUVGC09]. [BST07] requires one user to act as a virtual server. This
user, Alice, is trusted to act as a router for messages between all other parties and all
of the other users, Bob and Carol, negotiate a MAC key with her. When sending a
message to the group, Bob uses the MAC key he established with Alice and sends the
message to her. Alice decrypts the message, and re-encrypts with MAC key for her
and Carol before forwarding the message on to Carol as well. The amount of trust
placed in the user chosen as the virtual server creates a massive power imbalance and
the protocol can fall apart if this user acts dishonestly.
A more equitable approach is [GUVGC09]’s mpOTR, which makes use of ephemeral
signing keys that are revealed at the end of every conversation. The authors also in-
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troduced several useful sub-protocols for performing key exchange and agreement in
a deniable fashion. The drawback to this approach is rooted in how the protocol
defines the ending of a conversation. A user joining or leaving a conversation, at the
protocol level, triggers a shutdown of the old conversation and creation of a new one
with this user added or removed. In a high traffic chat room this may lead to keys
being rotated far too frequently.
4.2.2 Using short-lived signatures
To adapt OTR short-lived signatures we could modify the mpOTR of protocol [GUVGC09]
to make use of short-lived signatures instead of traditional signatures. This would
remove the need for ephemeral signing keys in the protocol altogether since short-
lived signatures do not require the private key to be released to allow forgeries to be
created.
Recall that mpOTR also requires tearing down and setting up a new conversation
whenever the set of participants in a group conversation changes. By using short-
lived signatures instead, key rotation is no longer necessary and this overhead can be
significantly reduced.
It is important to note that this produces a slightly different result than in other
OTR protocols (two-party or the other multi-party proposals). In the other protocols,
until the MAC (or ephemeral signing) key is leaked only the parties in the conversation
can verify the authenticity of the message. Our short-lived approach also eliminates
the need to explicitly leak the keys, though while the signature is valid there is no
restriction on who is able to verify signatures. Practically this should not be of great
concern since OTR is an interactive protocol. The parties communicating can use
very short time periods to reduce the chances of a third party being able to verify a
signature they were not intended to.
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4.3 Voting
End-to-end verifiable (E2E) voting systems were introduced by Chaum in 1981 [Cha81].
These are voting systems that provide a universally verifiable proof that the tally
was computed correctly and a voter verifiable proof that no ballots were modified
or dropped. The challenge with these systems is protecting the ballot secrecy from
the tallying authority, and further, preventing the voter from being able to prove to
someone else how they voted.
4.3.1 Homomorphic tallying backbone
Consider the following template for an E2E scheme that is the backbone of dozens of
schemes in the literature. A voter wishes to cast a vote for Alice in an election. To do
this, she uses a voting machine that generates an encryption of Alice: JAK. Assume
the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic; that is, Jm1K · Jm2K = Jm1 + m2K
for some efficient operation · such as multiplication. Exponential Elgamal [CGS97]
and Paillier [Pai99] are examples of such a scheme. Assume the decryption key is
shared amongst a set of n trustees (that are mutually distrustful) such that any
m ≤ n of them can come together to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under this
shared key [Ped91]. For example, m = 3 and n = 5.
Assuming Alice can successfully get an encryption of the candidate she chooses
(the critical issue we will return to) then the votes can be added up under encryption
using the homomorphic property. In the simplest case of a two party race, votes for
Alice might be encoded as 1 and votes for Bob as -1. The homomorphic property
is used to sum up the encryptions and then the trustees convene to decrypt only
this final summation of votes. A portion of the voting literature has been devoted to
extending this idea to more than two candidates [HS00, Hir01, PAB+04, KY02]. Any
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member of the public can validate that the individual encrypted votes sum to the
same value that is decrypted, and the trustees can prove in zero knowledge that they
are performing the decryption operation correctly without changing the value [Ped91].
The final question is how the voter can be confident that when she asks the voting
machine for an encryption of Alice, it actually encrypts Alice and not Bob. Any proof
she receives should be non-transferrable — that is, she should not be able to show it
to Mallory as proof that she voted for Alice less Mallory be able to coerce her vote
or to purchase it for money.
4.3.2 A solution based on DV proofs
The following system is a simplification of several ideas in the literature (cf. [MN06,
DLM12]), put into terms of designated verifier proofs (see Section 2.3.3). Imagine the
voter enters the voting booth with a keypair 〈sk, pk〉. Both keys might be printed as
QR codes on a piece of paper. She scans the code for pk and asks for an encryption
of Alice. The voting machine prints out JAK (where A is the encoding of Alice) which
it asserts is correct. It then prints out a designated verifier zero knowledge proof,
using pk, that has the following semantics: either JAK is an encryption of A; or I
(the voting machine) know sk; or both. Since the voter has not revealed sk to the
voting machine, she believes the first clause to be true. The voter then scans sk. The
voting machine responds with a second proof of the following form: either JBK is an
encryption of B; or I know sk; or both. The voter knows the first clause cannot be
true, given the first proof, and therefore the second clause is true.
If the voter shows these proofs to Mallory, the proofs claim she voted for Alice
and that she voted for Bob, and both are of the exact same form! Mallory cannot
distinguish which is ‘real.’ The only distinguishing feature is the timing of the pro-
cedure. The ‘real’ proof is the one given to the voter before revealing sk. Since she
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is in the voting booth at this time, only she knows which is ‘real.’
4.3.3 Using short-lived proofs
The designated verifier scheme has one major drawback. Voters have to prepare a
keypair to take into the booth. On paper, this may seem largely inconsequential. But
in a real election with a wide range of voters — many of which are non-technical and
may not own a computer or smartphone — we could expect a number of accessibility
and usability issues. Voters may be unable to generate the keypair, may enter sk
at the wrong time, enter sk instead of pk, etc.. It is also important that sk is truly
secret or the voting machine could cheat.
We propose to simplify this scheme further with short-lived proofs. The basic
voting procedure is largely the same as in the designated verifier scheme. The voter
receives an encryption (asserted to be) of JAK. This is printed on a sheet of paper
that also includes the current time. The voter must confirm that the time is correct
using her watch or smartphone. The voting machine immediately prints a short-lived
zero knowledge proof (say that expires in 60 seconds) that JAK is an encryption of
A. After 60 seconds, it prints a second proof (incorrect and simulated due to the
expiration) that JAK is an encryption of B.
Once again, the voter has two contradicting proofs: one that shows a vote for Alice
and one for Bob. The proofs are of exactly the same form and the only distinguishing
feature is the timing of the proofs. The ‘real’ proof is the one that was issued within




In this thesis, we introduced a new variety of digital signatures which only retain the
non-repudiation property for a pre-determined amount of “time”. We described four
different short-lived schemes, one built on top of an existing digital signature scheme
and three additional more concise constructions. We identified several desirable prop-
erties and evaluated our short-lived schemes against them. No one scheme managed
to attain all of these properties, so it is likely that all of our proposed short-lived
signatures will excel in different scenarios. As well as being a drop-in replacement
for conventional digital signatures in most cases, we also described several potential
use cases including two in instant messaging and voting that are uniquely suited to
short-lived signatures and proofs.
Finally, our work blends the notion of real world time together with that of com-
putational time. Much of the future work pertaining to short-lived signatures, such
as preparing guidelines for how to choose an appropriate δ, is likely to rely on a better
understanding of this interface.
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